How Is Saudi Arabia Fueling ‘Conflicts’ in the Red Sea?

By Natnael Gecho Only days after war broke out in Sudan between the national army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) on April 15, 2023, all eyes turned to Saudi Arabia. Riyadh immediately cast itself as a mediator seeking to end the fighting and prevent its regional spread, insisting that it maintained an equal distance from both warring parties. However, as the conflict dragged on and shifted course, Saudi Arabia soon found itself drawn deeper into the arena. According to various reports and security analyses, the kingdom gradually aligned with the Sudanese army, eventually emerging as one of its most prominent financial and logistical backers. This major shift in Saudi policy—moving from attempting to extinguish the Sudanese war to arguably stoking it—raises critical questions about Riyadh’s declared strategy versus its actions on the ground. When viewed alongside Saudi involvement in other Red Sea dossiers, these questions multiply. As this analysis explores, Saudi intervention has arguably prolonged the devastating war in Sudan. Meanwhile, the Yemeni portfolio offers a parallel example of policies that have tended to aggravate regional fault lines rather than resolve them, with escalation persisting for years. A similar pattern extends to Riyadh’s relationship with, and support for, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in its conflict with Ethiopia’s federal government, as well as its maneuvers regarding Eritrea and its rivalry with Addis Ababa. The net result is that Saudi Arabia increasingly appears to be a principal driver of tension in the Red Sea basin, inadvertently or deliberately backing actors that inflame local crises and undermine broader regional security. Jeddah: From Mediation to a Test of Influence The Jeddah platform was among the most prominent diplomatic tracks launched following the outbreak of the war. The Declaration of Commitments issued by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the RSF on May 11, 2023, focused heavily on protecting civilians, refraining from targeting infrastructure, and facilitating unhindered humanitarian access. However, the agreements and successive truces failed to withstand mutual violations, and subsequent rounds of negotiations ultimately faltered. The mediation failed to translate initial pledges into a sustainable cessation of hostilities. Over time, attention shifted away from Riyadh’s capacity to bring adversaries to the table, focusing instead on the nature of its covert influence—specifically, how its backing of the Sudanese army has enabled Khartoum to rebuff truce proposals amid continued military supplies. Air Bridge to Port Sudan and Heavy Military Support In July 2026, the Global Institute for Strategic Studies (GISS) published a report detailing an active air bridge between Riyadh and Port Sudan, operated via executive jets belonging to Alpha Star Aviation and Sky Prime Aviation. According to findings from the investigation, the shipments included three batteries of M777 155mm howitzers, alongside associated ammunition, heavy equipment, and specialized training arrangements. This pointed to a clear escalation beyond diplomatic engagement—delivering military hardware with direct, tangible implications for the Sudanese army’s combat sustainability. Further compounding these developments are allegations that a portion of this military aid reached allied factions fighting alongside the army—including groups designated as terrorist organizations and subjected to U.S. sanctions, such as the Al-Baraa Bin Malik Brigade—raising profound compliance issues regarding international arms embargoes. Did Saudi Support Embolden al-Burhan’s Intransigence? The United Nations has continuously warned of the catastrophic human toll of the conflict. According to the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), an estimated 33.7 million people will require humanitarian assistance in 2026. Despite this staggering crisis, Sudanese army chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has consistently rejected diplomatic overtures and proposals for a humanitarian truce. This dynamic was on stark display in September 2026, when General al-Burhan raised strong objections to a U.S.-backed proposal for a 90-day ceasefire. It manifested again on October 7, 2026, when he flatly refused to negotiate a operational standstill, instead demanding the full military reconquest of territory held by the RSF. Such hardline stances underscore the direct nexus between battlefield support and diplomatic obstruction. Observers suggest that external backing has hardened the army’s aversion to compromise. At the same time, regional policy remains complex and subject to competing pressures. On April 20, 2026, Reuters cited two Pakistani security sources and a diplomat revealing that Islamabad had suspended a $1.5 billion deal to supply Sudan with weapons and aircraft after Saudi Arabia requested the termination and withdrew financial backing—highlighting the limits of uncritical military support under Western scrutiny. Yemen: Military Intervention and Shifting Alliances The ambiguities in Saudi conflict management are not confined to Sudan. In Yemen, the kingdom has spearheaded a broad military intervention since March 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition, ostensibly to restore the internationally recognized government after the Houthis seized Sanaa. As the conflict protracted, Yemen became a prime example of the friction between military intervention and diplomatic mediation, illustrating the inherent difficulties of balancing the role of an active belligerent with that of an impartial peacebroker. Within this framework, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah)—a diverse political coalition encompassing Islamist, tribal, and nationalist elements—converged with Riyadh against the Houthis. Deep historical ties between Islah and Saudi Arabia were further cemented as the war evolved. The Contradiction of Islamist Alliances and Counter-Terrorism Riyadh’s operational coordination with Islah, alongside its backing of a Sudanese military apparatus deeply intertwined with domestic Islamists, highlights a stark contradiction with the kingdom’s official foreign policy stance against political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood. This paradox was underscored in a policy paper published by the Brussels-based European Foundation for Democracy on October 23, 2026. The paper highlighted that Sudanese Islamists have spent decades embedding themselves within the state’s security architecture—particularly the military—and maintaining transnational ties. The foundation expressed bewilderment at Riyadh’s strategic embrace of these factions. This brings historical concerns regarding terrorism financing back to the surface. U.S. diplomatic cables released via WikiLeaks in 2010 previously highlighted Washington’s anxieties regarding financial flows from Saudi private donors to extremist networks. Although both Riyadh and Washington have since implemented rigorous counter-terrorism measures and targeted sanctioned institutions—such as branches of the Al-Haramain Foundation—current alignments risk reviving old scrutiny. The Horn of Africa: Calculations Involving Eritrea and Ethiopia The regional puzzle grows denser when examining the Horn of Africa. Eritrea controls critical Red Sea coastline and strategic ports, principally Assab and Massawa. Ever since its independence left Ethiopia landlocked, Addis Ababa has remained heavily reliant on alternative maritime corridors, primarily through Djibouti. This sensitive geography intersects directly with geopolitical competition in the Red Sea, the rivalry between Asmara and Addis Ababa, and the enduring diplomatic friction between Egypt and Ethiopia concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) and Nile water security. Consequently, any Saudi rapprochement or security coordination with Eritrea carries profound regional weight—potentially intersecting with developments in Sudan and broader naval security frameworks. While Eritrea was notably absent from the 14 nations that signed the founding declaration of the Saudi-hosted maritime defense alliance in July 2026, bilateral security arrangements continue to shape the regional balance of power. Riyadh and Mogadishu: Points of Convergence Accusations of regional overreach have also surfaced in Somalia. Recent reports allege that Riyadh has overseen the training of over 5,000 Somali recruits in Ghuri Jabal (Galgaduud region), utilizing private military contractors from countries such as Romania, Ukraine, South Africa, and Colombia. The nine-month program follows a high-level defense cooperation agreement signed between Somali and Saudi defense ministers in Riyadh. Critics and rival political factions have expressed concern that these forces could potentially be leveraged beyond Somali borders, including deployment into external theaters like Sudan—though these allegations remain contested. Conclusion Saudi Arabia continues to host diplomatic summits, champion dialogue, and project an image of a stabilizing anchor. However, from Port Sudan to Mogadishu, the capital sponsoring truces faces persistent accusations of concurrently empowering forces that destabilize the Red Sea theater. Whether through proxy alignments, military provisions, or shifting regional partnerships, Riyadh finds itself caught in an inherent contradiction: can a state successfully act as both impartial referee and partisan player? As crises continue to reverberate across the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, the answer to that question will profoundly shape the future security architecture of the Red Sea. (Natnael Gecho is researcher and investigative journalist focusing on the Horn of Africa issues.)